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I. INTRODUCTION 
The undeniable fact that drives this appeal is that residential roadways and golf course 
cart paths are two different things. And, indeed, other than when filing its lien claims, Knife 
River treated the two projects as two different things: it estimated the scope of work for the two 
projects separately; it tracked the projects separately; it invoiced the projects separately. Because 
Knife River's claims of liens will fail if this fact is recognized, Knife River asks this Court to 
redefine that fact by reducing these two separate things to their common elements and hold that, 
because they are made of the same product, they are the same thing. The district court applied 
such an approach and, in so doing, committed multiple errors, each of which provides an 
independent basis for overturning the district court's judgment. IF A and IGP respectfully 
request that this Court reject the approach advanced by Knife River and adopted by the district 
court and apply the law to the facts as they exist-not the facts as they can be redefined 
II. ARGUMENT 
1. The roadways and the cart-paths were constructed pursuant to two separate 
contracts. 
In its opening brief, IF A argued that the district court impermissibly allowed Knife River 
to tack together the work on two separate contracts in order to revive expired lien rights for the 
roadway work and to gain an earlier priority date for the cart path work. The focus of IF A's 
argument in that regard was that the Masco Proposal could not have included the cart paths 
because the scope of work for the cart paths was unknown when the parties entered the Masco 
Proposal and, further, because the reason the scope of work was unknown is because ELL did 
not have a contract for the cart path work. Cross-App. Br. at 13. Because the scope of work for 
the cart paths was unknown, material terms were left open for negotiation and, as a matter of 
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black letter contract law, the Masco Proposal could not have included the cart path work. 
Cross-App. Br. at 13. 
"It is essential to an enforceable contract that it be sufficiently 
definite and certain in its terms and requirements so that it can be 
determined what acts are to be performed and when performance is 
complete." Dale's Service Co., Inc. v. Jones, 96 Idaho 662, 664, 
534 P.2d 1102, 1104 (1975). "No enforceable contract comes into 
being when parties leave a material term for future negotiations, 
creating a mere agreement to agree." Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, 
Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 614, 114 P.3d 974, 984 (2005) (quoting from 
17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 181 (2004)). 
Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep't of Admin., 155 Idaho 55, _,305 P.3d 499,507 (2013). 
Knife River's response to this argument and authority serves only to re-affirm IF A's 
position. Knife River argues that it, along with ELL, intended for the unit price on the Masco 
Proposal to include any additional paving projects that might arise-subject, of course, to the 
prevailing market rates when that work did arise. Cross-Resp. Br. at 14. However, an agreement 
that one party will provide to the other an undetermined amount of product to satisfy a not-yet 
determined scope of work for which the prevailing market rates would be charged is not a 
contract: it is, at best, is an agreement to agree. Accordingly, to the extent that the Masco 
Proposal can even be fairly said to contemplate cart path work, it did not create an enforceable 
contract for the cart path work and was, therefore, nothing more than an agreement tb agree. 
This Court should hold as a matter of law that the roadways and cart paths were constructed 
pursuant to two separate contracts. 
2. The 113-day time lapse between finishing the scope of work on one project and 
being assigned a scope of work on the next project is sufficient to put a sub-
contractor on inquiry notice of two contracts between the contractor and developer. 
In its opening brief, IF A argued that the 113-day time lapse between the two projects was 
sufficient to put Knife River on notice of two contracts between ELL and the developer. Knife 
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River responded by claiming that there was not really a 113-day time lapse and, given its limited 
exposure to the project, there was no reason it should have been on inquiry notice of the two 
contracts between ELL and the developer. The first point should be rejected because it is not 
supported by evidence or law; the second point should be rejected because, contrary to Knife 
River's position, it was not a strict materialman. 
The two points Knife River argues in support of its argument that there was not a 113-day 
time lapse between substantial completion of the roadways and commencing the cart path work 
must be rejected because such points are inconsistent with the facts and, as a matter of well-
settled law, the trivial work Knife River claims to have done on August 29, 2007, is insufficient 
to extend the time for filing its roadways lien. 
First, Knife River's claim that the roadways were never completed is directly refuted by 
Daniels' deposition testimony: "Q: SO let's talk about the state of completion of this project 
right now. Are the roadways paved? A: Yes." R. Vol. 6 p. 1011 (Daniel's Depo. 20:15-18). 
While Daniels later tried to equivocate and claim that the roadways were only 95% completed, 
when pressed for specifics the only remaining roadway work that Daniels was able to identify 
was a repair job that was required because another subcontractor had caused some damage to the 
completed roadway. R. Vol. VI, p. 1022 (Daniels Depo. 61: 16-62:8). 
Second, Knife River's claim that it was working on the roadways as late as August 29, 
2007, does not change the analysis because the type of work performed by Knife River on that 
date is not sufficient to extend the time for filing its lien claim. The roadway work that Knife 
River claims to have done on August 29, 2007, (124 days after the date Knife River substantially 
completed the roadways) was described by employees as "add-ons." R. Vol. III, p. 340. 
Significantly, there is no evidence in the record that Knife River charged ELL for these 
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"add-ons" (a circumstance that also calls into question Knife River's attempts to characterize the 
Masco Proposal as an "open account"). Because a lien claimant cannot extend the time for filing 
its claim of lien by engaging in trivial work, these gratuitous "add-ons" 124 days after Knife 
River substantially completed the roadways cannot extend the time for filing a lien claim for that 
roadway work. 
This Court should reject Knife River's second argument because it is a disingenuous 
attempt to position itself as a strict materialman. Knife River argues that it was only on-site when 
ELL called it to complete a portion of the project and, because it was only on site for limited 
periods of time, it had no knowledge of facts that would put it on inquiry notice of the status of 
the two contracts between ELL and the developer. However, where a subcontractor provides 
both labor and services, the subcontractor's presence on-site to complete a project or a portion of 
a project gives him additional knowledge of circumstances that would put him on notice of two 
contracts between the contractor and the developer. See Franklin BUilding Supply Co. v. 
Sumpter, 139 Idaho 846, 852, 87 P.3d 955, 961 (2004). Because Knife River was actually on 
site, constructing the projects, Knife River is not a strict materialman. Because Knife River was 
not a strict materialman, the fact that ELL assigned to Knife River a new and different scope of 
work when it was time to construct the cart paths is a fact that sufficient to "impute to [Knife 
River] constructive notice and put [it] on [its] inquiry to ascertain that two or more contracts did 
in fact exist." Gem State Lumber Co. v. School Dist. No.8, in Caribou County, 44 Idaho 359, 
256 P. 949,950 (1927). 
Under the undisputed facts of this case, Knife River was more than a strict materialman: 
it was placing and compacting asphalt on residential roadways. Knife River knew when it had 
substantially competed the roadway project. Knife River knew that there was also a golf course 
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project that the developer was contemplating. I As of the date the roadways were substantially 
completed, Knife River knew that it did not have the scope of work for the next project. As of 
the date the time for filing its claim of lien for the roadway project came and went, Knife River 
knew that it still did not have a scope of work for the cart path project. These are precisely the 
types of facts that should cause a subcontractor with an aging invoice of $166,603.50-who 
knows that it has been 90 days since it substantially completed its last project-to start asking 
questions. Because Knife River is not a strict materialman, it cannot reasonably claim that it had 
no reason to know that there was a 113-day time lapse between the two projects it was on-site 
performing. Accordingly, this Court should hold that, as a matter of law, Knife River had 
knowledge of facts sufficient to put it on inquiry notice of two contracts between ELL and the 
developer. 
3. This Court should reject Knife River's request to engage in a results oriented 
application of the facts to the law when classifying the type of improvements giving 
rise to Knife River's claim of lien. 
Rather than provide argument and authority supporting its proposed classification of 
roadways and cart paths as "improvements to the land," Knife River summarily concludes and 
declares that the district court's classification was correct and, following from that, Knife River 
argues that the district court's decision should be upheld because to decide otherwise would 
leave Knife River without a remedy.2 Cross-Resp. Br. at 23. The fact that a litigant will be left 
I Critically, there is nothing in the record that sufficiently defines Knife River's scope of work so as to support an 
argument that ELL was contractually bound to use Knife River to construct the golf course cart paths or that Knife 
River was contractually obligated to construct the golf course cart paths. Casey Daniel's claims that he intended to 
use Knife River if and when the cart path project was assigned to ELL is insufficient to create that contractual 
obligation. 
2 Knife River appears to have tacitly acknowledged the residential roadways and golf course cart paths constitute 
two improvements that are readily capable of apportionment. Accordingly, the remaining question of whether 
section 45-508 applies to the two improvements constructed by Knife River is whether those two improvements 
were properly classified as improvements to the land. Because the roadways were improperly classified as 
"improvements to the land" when they should have been classified as improvements upon the land (i.e., structures), 
the district court's conclusion that section 45-508 does not apply to this case was erroneous and should be reversed. 
CROSS APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 5 
without a remedy is not a proper factor upon which to rely when applying the facts of a case to 
the law. Accordingly, this Court should reject Knife River's results oriented approach and 
analysis. 
Not only is Knife River's results oriented analysis an improper approach to the problem, 
it is also incorrect in that it simply misapplies the statute. In its argument, Knife River suggests 
that if the roadways and cart paths are classified as structures, it will be left without a remedy 
because it cannot foreclose on dedicated roadways and, further, that cart paths are essentially 
worthless unless they are associated with the surrounding golf course. Cross-Resp. Br. 23-34. 
Knife River's argument ignores the fact that Idaho Code § 45-505 mandates that the district 
court, when crafting a decree of foreclosure, determine the amount of land required for the 
convenient use and occupation of the building, structure, or other improvement. No one has ever 
suggested that Idaho Code § 45-505 does not apply to structures (improvements upon the land). 
And, indeed, Fairfax v. Ramirez, provides authority for the proposition that a lien claimant, 
constructing or improving a roadway, may obtain a decree of foreclosure for the dominant parcel 
of land benefited by the improvements to the easement. 133 Idaho 72, 78, 982 P.2d 375, 381 
(Ct. App. 1999).3 Accordingly, Knife River's suggestion that it would be left without a remedy 
if the residential roadways and golf course cart paths were classified as structures is not 
supported by any reasonable interpretation of the statute. This Court should reject Knife River's 
results-oriented classification argument. 
4. There is no principled reason why Idaho Code § 45-505 does not apply to liens for 
improvements to the land. 
Idaho Code § 45-505 requires a district court, when crafting a decree of foreclosure, to 
take evidence regarding the amount of land required for the reasonable use and occupation of the 
3 This holding suggests either that section 45-505 applies to both types of improvements or, if 45-505 applies only to 
structures, easements (roadways) are properly classified as structures. 
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liened res. By its plain language, section 45-505 applies to land "upon which or in connection 
with which any professional services are performed or any building, improvement or structure is 
constructed .... " There is nothing within the plain language of section 45-505 that suggests it 
should not apply to both liens for improvements to the land and liens for improvements upon the 
land. 
In its opposition brief, Knife River cites the case Weber v. Eastern Idaho Packing Corp., 
94 Idaho 694, 698, 496 P.2d 693, 697 (1972) in support of its argument that section 45-505 is a 
"limiting statute" that applies only where there is a structure upon the land, not when there is an 
improvement to the land. However, in Weber the lien claimant performed work on the entire 
parcel subject to the lien and was, therefore, rightfully entitled to a lien on the entire parcel. Id 
Knife River's use of Weber in support of its proposed application of 45-505 is logically flawed 
because section 45-505 is not a lien limiting statue. Rather, section 45-505 provides the lien 
claimant a mechanism to foreclose on property beyond the contours of where the work giving 
rise to the lien was performed when the liened work is performed on less than the entire parcel. 
The limiting function of section 45-505 is that the district court may allow the lien claimant to 
foreclose on only so much additional property as is necessary for the convenient use and 
occupation of the liened res. 
The district court's conclusion that section 45-505 only applies to structures and not to 
improvements to the land is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute and produces an 
absurd result. For example, if a lien claimant graded one-quarter of an acre on a 20-acre parcel, 
section 45-505 allows the district judge, in crafting the decree of foreclosure, to authorize 
foreclosure of the one-quarter acre that was graded and so much of the remaining parcel as is 
necessary for the convenient use and occupation of the one-quarter acre that was graded. Knife 
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River asks this Court to adopt an interpretation of the statute whereby a lien claimant who grades 
that one-quarter acre is entitled to a decree of foreclosure on the entire 20-acres, regardless of 
whether the remaining 19 and three-quarters acres benefited from the work of the lien claimant. 
There is nothing in the lien statute to support Knife River's over-reaching interpretation. 
Because there is no principled basis for the conclusion that § 45-505 only applies to liens 
for structures and excludes liens for improvements of the land, this Court should reverse that 
portion of the district court's order holding that § 45-505 does not apply and remand this case for 
instructions to take evidence for the amount of land subject to the lien. 
5. So long as there are two distinct improvements, readily capable of apportionment, 
there is no principled reason why Idaho Code § 45-508 does not apply to liens for 
improvements to the land. 
Knife River appears to have tacitly conceded that the residential roadways and golf 
course cart paths constitute two improvements that are readily capable of apportionment.4 For its 
argument opposing IF A's claim that section 45-508 required Knife River to designate the 
amounts due on the two separate projects, Knife River relies on the district court's incorrect 
classification of the two projects as "improvements to the land," combined with this Court's 
decision in Hopkins Northwest, for the proposition that the improvements at issue (even though 
there are two) are not subject to the apportionment requirements of section 45-508. However, 
because the facts of this case present an issue that did not exist in Hopkins Northwest, this case 
presents an opportunity to revisit that decision. Specifically, if there are two separate and 
distinct improvements, readily capable of apportionment, does the Hopkins Northwest conclusion 
that section 45-508 applies only to structures and not to improvements to the land still hold? 
4 In its briefing, Knife River alternates between discussing the cart paths and roadways each in their own right and 
then referring to the two separate projects as "asphalt paving within the development." Knife River does not present 
any argument or authority in opposition to IFA's position that the two projects, which were tracked under separate 
job numbers and invoiced separately, constitute two separate, distinct improvements. 
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What if, for example, there are two separate golf courses, constructed for the same owner under 
the same contract? What if those two golf courses are non-contiguous? One does not need to 
push the logical consequences of that holding far to demonstrate a possibility that absurd results 
could follow. 
In its opening memorandum, IF A argued that the measure of whether a lien claim was 
subject to section 45-508 was whether there were, indeed, two separate improvements that were 
reasonably subject to apportionment.s In support of that argument, IF A contrasted the fact 
pattern of the present case with the fact patterns from Hopkins Northwest and the California case 
of Warren v. Hopkins, 110 Cal. 506,42 P. 986 (Cal. 1895). IFA then argued that the rule to be 
derived from Hopkins Northwest and Warren v. Hopkins, is that where the improvements are not 
readily capable of apportionment, the statutory designation requirement found in section 45-508 
and its California counterpart is not required.6 However, if the two separate improvements are 
readily capable of apportionment, then section 45-508 should apply. There is no principled 
reason why this analysis would differ based solely upon the classification of the improvement. 
Knife River's attempt to show that IFA and lOP have confused the concepts of "equitable 
apportionment" with the statutory designation requirement of section 45-508 serves only to 
obfuscate the rather simple point that IFA and lOP made. To be clear, if the lienable work is not 
readily capable of apportionment (i.e., if a court must rely on equitable apportionment to 
5 In an attempt to obfuscate the issue, Knife River argues that IF A and IGP are confused by the concepts of equitable 
apportionment and the designation requirement of Idaho Code § 45-508 because they use the word "apportion" and 
"designate" interchangeably. That is not the case. A review of both parties' opening submissions demonstrates that, 
while the words "apportion" and "designate" are used interchangeably, both IF A and IGP argue that the duty to 
"designate" arises when a lien claimant can readily apportion the amounts due on two or more improvements, 
whereas equitable apportionment is a remedy that a court may invoke where there is a single improvement that is not 
readily capable of apportionment, but which may cover multiple lots. IF A acknowledges and agrees that, in the 
latter case, a lien claimant is not required to attempt to equitably apportion its own lien claims amongst the various 
lots subject to its lien. 
6 While IF A maintains that because the roadways and cart paths are properly characterized as structures, it is not 
necessary for this Court to revisit the Hopkins Northwest decision, if this Court finds that the cart paths and 
residential roadways are not structures, then it should revisit Hopkins Northwest. 
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detennine the proportionate share of a lien imposed on each of several lots subject to the lien) 
then-consistent with the rule set forth in Hopkins Northwest-the statutory designation 
requirement of 45-508 is not required. However if-as in this case-the facts are such that the 
lien claimant separately tracked the labor and materials provided for two separate and distinct 
projects (though for the same land owner) and if-as in this case-the lien claimant is able to 
pinpoint exactly how much labor and materials went into each of the two separate and distinct 
projects, then the statutory designation requirement of section 45-508 does apply, regardless of 
how the projects are classified. 
In this case, Knife River kept precise track of the labor and materials that went into each 
of the two projects for which it provided asphalt paving and paving services: it provided 
separate estimates for the amount of paving required to complete each project, it tracked the two 
projects under different job numbers, and it provided separate invoices for each of the two 
projects. Based on these facts, under the interpretation of the statute advanced by IF A, Idaho 
Code § 45-508 requires that Knife River-consistent with its estimates, job tracking, and 
invoices-make clear in its claim(s) of lien that $166,603.50 of the lien claim was the amount 
attributable to the work it perfonned on the residential roadways and that $49,474.80 was the 
amount attributable to the front nine-holes of the golf course. Then, pursuant to the statutory 
mandate of Idaho Code Section 45-505, the district court would have the duty when crafting the 
judgment and decree of foreclosure to detennine the amount of land subject to the lien for the 
residential roadway work and the amount of land subject to the lien for the cart-path work. 7 
7 Because it is reasonable for a golf-course to operate as a nine-hole facility, IFA should have been afforded the 
opportunity, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 45-505, to argue that only the front nine holes of the golf course were 
required for the convenient use and occupation of cart paths built to service the front nine holes. Based on this, the 
district court could have entered a judgment and decree of foreclosure allowing Knife River to foreclose on its golf-
course related lien against the front nine-holes ofthe golf course. 
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However, because Knife River failed to comply with the designation requirement of section 
45-508, its liens should be postponed to all other liens on the property. 
III. CONCLUSION 
IF A and IGP respectfully request that this Court hold that the district court erred in 
finding that residential roadways and golf course cart paths are same thing. From there, Cross 
Appellants request that this Court overturn any or all of the district court's erroneous legal 
conclusions stemming from that incorrect fact: there were two separate contracts because the 
scope of work for building the two different projects was different and defined at different times; 
Knife River had every reason to be on inquiry notice of the two contracts between ELL and the 
developer because Knife River finished one project and then waited several months before being 
assigned the next; because Knife River tracked the two projects separately-from the bidding 
process, to the employee log sheets, to invoicing-the requirement to designate the amounts due 
for these two separate projects applies and, Knife River's failure to do so causes its claims oflien 
to be postponed to all other liens on the property. IF A respectfully requests that this Court 
remand the matter to the district court with instructions to enter an order consistent with these 
conclusions. 
DATED this 13th day of March, 2014. 
CROSS APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 11 
FISHER RAINEY HUDSON 
Rebecca A. Rainey - of the 
Attorneys for Integrated Financial 
Associates, Inc., Geneva Equities, LLC and 
Idaho Golf Partners, Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on March 13, 2014, a true and correct copy of CROSS 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF was served upon the following by the method indicated 
below: 
Mark D. Perison 
Tricia K. Soper 
MARK D. PERI SON, P.A. 
314 S. 9th St., Ste 300 
P.O. Box 6575 
Boise, ID 83707-6575 
Attorneyfor Idaho Golf Partners, Inc. 
Thomas E. Dvorak ISB No. 5047 
Elizabeth M. Donick ISB No. 8019 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Attorneys for Stanley Consultants, Inc. 
David T. Krueck 
FISHER PUSCH & KRUECK LLP 
P.O. Box 1308 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorneysfor Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc 
CROSS APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 12 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
L~lHand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
t~Hand Delivered 
( \) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
HHand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile. 
